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WHEN DOES THE CHAIN BREAK? PRESCRIBING
AROUND DRUG MANUFACTURER FRAUD
INTRODUCTION
Approximately eleven million prescriptions are written every day in
the United States,1 and each prescription decision represents one link
in a long and complex chain that begins with drug manufacturers and
ends with the patient.2  What happens when that first link, the drug
manufacturer, misleads healthcare systems, physicians, and the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) regarding a drug’s side effects?3
Over the past decade, several pharmaceutical companies have been
subject to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) claims for engaging in fraudulent and misleading practices.4
RICO prohibits the generation of income from racketeering activity5
including mail and wire fraud,6 which are common methods of mis-
leading and fraudulent conduct.7
Third Party Payors (TPPs),8 such as healthcare plans and insurance
companies, have actively brought claims against manufacturers as
TPPs pay a percentage of or the entire cost of their members’ pre-
scriptions.9  RICO claims have proven profitable for plaintiffs,10 with
1. Alexandra Sifferlin, Americans Spent a Record Amount on Medicine in 2014, TIME (Apr.
13, 2015), http://time.com/3819889/medicine-spending/.
2. See In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 804 F.3d 633, 645–46 (3d Cir.
2015); In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 712 F.3d 21, 38 (1st Cir. 2013); UFCW
Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121, 134 (2d Cir. 2010); United Food & Commercial
Workers Cent. Pa. & Reg’l Health & Welfare Fund v. Amgen, Inc., 400 F. App’x 255, 257 (9th
Cir. 2010).
3. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 635–36; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 27–29; UFCW Local 1776,
620 F.3d at 124–25, 127–28; In re Epogen & Aranesp Off-Label Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig.,
590 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1290–91 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
4. See, e.g., In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 635; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 27–29; UFCW Local
1776, 620 F.3d at 134–36; United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa., 400 Fed. App’x at 257.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2016).
6. § 1961(1).
7. See, e.g., Sergeants Benevolent Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLP,
806 F.3d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 2015); In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 636; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 34; In
re Epogen, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 1287.
8. Third Party Payors (TPPs) are organizations, both public and private, which pay or insure
health and medical expenses for consumers.  Common examples of TPPs are insurance compa-
nies, healthcare plans and Medicare. Third Party Payor, AM. HEALTH LAW ASS’N, https://
www.healthlawyers.org/hlresources/Health%20Law%20Wiki/Third%20Party%20Payor.aspx
(last visited Jan. 10, 2017).
9. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 634–35; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 38–39; UFCW Local 1776,
620 F.3d at 134–36; United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa., 400 F. App’x at 257.
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courts awarding damages as high as $147 million to a single plaintiff.11
Recent data indicates total expenditures for prescription medication
in the United States exceeds $374 billion annually.12  Thus, drug man-
ufacturers are incentivized to aggressively market their products, ob-
tain market share, and maximize profits.13  Accordingly, they spend
over $20 billion each year on drug promotion.14  Conversely, health-
care systems and insurance companies are suffering multi-million dol-
lar losses because of manufacturer fraud.15
A federal circuit split exists as to whether TPPs are permitted to
bring RICO claims against drug manufacturers.  The underlying issue
is whether the independent decisions of physicians to prescribe the
manufacturer’s drug to patients severs the chain of causation and pre-
cludes TPPs from bringing a RICO claim against that manufacturer.16
The First and Third Circuits hold that TPPs may bring RICO claims
against pharmaceutical companies because the presence of in-
termediaries does not break the chain of causation.17  In 2013, the
First Circuit held in In re Neurontin that the prescription decisions of
doctors do not effect RICO causation.18  This approach was echoed by
the Third Circuit in In re Avandia when it held the presence of in-
termediaries, such as doctors and patients, does not disrupt causation
in RICO claims.19
The Second and Ninth Circuits have a different approach.20  In
UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., the Second Circuit held that
physician prescription decisions sever the chain of causation.21  Simi-
larly, in United Food & Commercial Workers Central Pennsylvania v.
Amgen, Inc., the Ninth Circuit dismissed a complaint because it al-
10. This data is based on 2014 expenditures.  Sifferlin, supra note 1.
11. In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 799 F. Supp. 2d 110, 112 (D. Mass. 2011).
12. This data is based on 2014 expenditures.  Sifferlin, supra note 1.
13. Id.
14. Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent
Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLP at 3–4, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem)
(No. 15-1525) (citing Persuading the Prescribers: Pharmaceutical Industry Marketing and its In-
fluence on Physicians and Patients, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Nov. 11, 2013), http://tinyurl.com/
mac4o5d).
15. See, e.g., In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 32 (noting Kaiser estimated it suffered $60 million in
losses as a result of Pfizer’s misrepresentations).
16. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sergeants Benevolent Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund v.
Sanofi-Aventis United States LLP at 2–5, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525).
17. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 643–46; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 34–36.
18. In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 38–39.
19. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 645.
20. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 132; United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa., 400 F.
App’x at 257 (holding that prescription decision by doctors break the chain of causation).
21. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 135.
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leged a weak causal chain between the drug manufacturer and TPPs
and therefore failed to meet RICO’s proximate cause requirements.22
In June 2016 in Sergeants Benevolent Association Health & Welfare
Fund v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLP, a healthcare plan appealed the dis-
missal of its RICO claim.23  The Supreme Court denied the petition
for certiorari leaving the split unresolved.24
This Comment contends the First and Third Circuits’ approach, that
the presence of intermediaries does not break the chain of causation,
should be adopted because pharmaceutical manufacturer’s marketing
efforts target TPPs.  In turn, when manufacturers engage in fraudulent
behavior TPPs suffer economic injury by paying the majority of the
drug’s cost once it is prescribed.25  Part II provides an overview of the
RICO statute and describes the methodology used by TPPs to deter-
mine whether to pay for a drug prescribed to its members.26  In addi-
tion, Part II details both sides of the Circuit split.27
Part III argues the Supreme Court should adopt the First and Third
Circuits’ approach because: (1) TPPs are directly injured by the fraud-
ulent conduct of drug manufacturers28 and (2) such an injury is cogni-
zable under RICO.29  Part IV explains the impact of adopting the First
and Third Circuits’ approach on: (1) the protection of healthcare con-
sumer health and safety through deterrence of drug manufacturer
fraud and (2) the ability of TPPs to obtain compensation for economic
loss suffered due to manufacturer fraud when the causal chain be-
tween manufacturers and TPPs is kept intact.30  Finally, Part V con-
cludes that allowing TPPs to bring RICO claims regardless of
physician prescription decisions will ensure drug manufacturers are
accountable for their fraudulent actions, will protect consumers from
22. United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa., 400 F. App’x at 257.
23. Sergeants brought suit against Sanofi-Aventis, a pharmaceutical company, for allegedly
misleading doctors and the FDA regarding the safety of an antibiotic developed by the company
in an effort to boost its prescriptions.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sergeants Benevolent Ass’n
Health & Welfare Fund at 10–12, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525).
24. Sergeants Benevolent Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-
1525) (denying petition for certiorari).
25. See In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 644; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 39.
26. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 635; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 43; UFCW Local 1776, 620
F.3d at 134–36; United Food & Commercial. Workers Cent. Pa., 400 F. App’x at 257.
27. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 635; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 26–27; UFCW Local 1776, 620
F.3d at 125; United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa. 400 F. App’x at 257.
28. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269–70 (1992); In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d
at 36.
29. In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d 34.
30. See infra Part IV.
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physical injury resulting from unsafe drugs, and fairly compensate
TPPs that have suffered economic loss.31
II. BACKGROUND
This Part explains the circuit split regarding whether prescription
decisions of physicians break the chain of causation in RICO claims.
Section A describes the relevant RICO provisions.32  Section B ex-
plains how TPPs approve drugs for members.33  Section C canvasses
the approach of the First and Third Circuits.34  Finally, Section D de-
scribes the Second and Ninth Circuits’ holdings that prescription deci-
sions by physicians are fatal to the RICO claims of TPPs.35
A. A Brief Overview of RICO Claims
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act,  com-
monly referred to as “RICO,”36 prohibits the derivation of income
from racketeering activity,37 or association with an enterprise affecting
interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity.38  The
term “racketeering activity” includes mail and wire fraud,39 which are
common grounds upon which TPPs bring RICO claims.40  RICO was
initially introduced to combat organized crime by connecting mafia
leaders to the criminal enterprises they oversaw.41  During RICO’s
legislative hearings, however, the Act’s supporters successfully pro-
posed the inclusion of private civil actions.42  Congress subsequently
included a provision allowing private parties injured by racketeering
activity to bring a civil action against wrongdoers.43  This provision
enables TPPs to bring RICO claims against pharmaceutical
manufacturers.
31. See In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 39–40; UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 129.
32. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–62, 1964 (2016).
33. See In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 634–35.
34. See id.; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 38–39.
35. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 134; United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa., 400 F.
App’x at 257.
36. In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 26.
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2016).
38. § 1962(c).
39. § 1961(1).
40. See, e.g., Sergeants Benevolent Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund, 806 F.3d at 74; In re Avandia,
804 F.3d at 636; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 34; In re Epogen, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 1287.
41. Nathan Koppel, They Call It RICO, and It Is Sweeping, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 20, 2011, 5:14
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704881304576094110829882704.
42. John L. Koenig, What Have They Done to Civil RICO: The Supreme Court Takes the
Racketeering Requirement Out of Racketeering, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 828–29 & n.33 (1986).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2016).
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In order to recover damages under RICO, a plaintiff must show the
following: (1) a substantive RICO violation under 18 U.S.C. § 1962,44
(2)  an injury to the plaintiff’s business or property,45 and (3) that the
injury was caused by the substantive RICO violation.46  The third ele-
ment constitutes the causation requirement.47  A party bringing a
RICO claim can sue to recover treble damages, court costs, and attor-
ney’s fees.48  It is within this framework that TPPs pursue fraud claims
against drug manufacturers.49
B. How a Third Party Payor Selects Drugs for its Members
TPPs cover the cost of prescriptions for drugs listed in its “formu-
lary,” which is a list of drugs approved for use by the TPP’s mem-
bers.50  The formulary is prepared by a Pharmacy Benefit Manager
(PBM)51 who carefully analyzes “research regarding a drug’s cost ef-
fectiveness, safety and efficacy.”52  The PBM uses this research to de-
velop a series of monographs53 that summarize all the evidence on the
drug under consideration for inclusion in the formulary.54  During the
screening process and monograph preparation, PBMs can be directly
and indirectly influenced by the input of drug manufacturers.55
44. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 129.  A substantive RICO violation involves engaging in
any of the “racketeering” activities listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), such as mail and wire fraud.
This is a common ground for RICO claims against drug manufacturers as they circulate their
misrepresentations to TPPs using these methods.
45. Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 649 (2008) (clarifying that such injury is
economic in nature, and constitutes injury to one’s business or property); UFCW Local 1776, 620
F.3d at 131.
46. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 131.
47. Id. Although this Comment focuses specifically on proximate cause it should be noted
that the RICO statute contains both proximate cause and but-for causation requirements.
Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268 (1992). See also In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 645 (quoting Bridge, 553 U.S.
at 650, 658); In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 34.
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2016).
49. See e.g,. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 634–36; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 26; UFCW Local
1776, 620 F.3d at 132; United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa., 400 F. App’x at 257.
50. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d 634–35.
51. Id.  The formulary is sometimes prepared by a committee, rather than a PBM. For in-
stance, Kaiser formularies were managed by a Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee. In re
Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 28–29.
52. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 634–35.
53. A monograph is a piece of writing typically used to present research on a single subject or
aspect of a subject. See Monograph, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/mon-
ograph (last visited Nov. 13, 2016).  In the context of drug manufacturing they provide descrip-
tions of drug, development information, treatments it can be used for, and dosage information.
How Drugs are Developed and Approved, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/
drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved/ (last visited Nov. 13,
2016).
54. In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 28–29.
55. Id. at 28.
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PBMs are directly influenced by the evidence and unpublished in-
formation regarding drug safety possessed by drug manufacturers.56
TPPs obtain this data from manufacturers utilizing it to prepare
monographs.57  In turn, PBMs rely heavily on the monographs when
making formulary decisions.58  Additionally, pharmaceutical compa-
nies indirectly influence TPPs’ formulary determinations.59  For in-
stance, a pharmaceutical company will build relationships with
influential TPP affiliates and also employ physicians associated with
TPPs to publish favorable articles about the company’s drug.60
If a PBM determines a particular drug is more advantageous than a
competing drug after the research and monograph phase, the more
advantageous drug is given preferred status on the formulary.61  Con-
sequently, the higher a drug’s preferential status on the formulary, the
more of its cost a TPP will cover.62  This, in turn, will reduce the co-
payment a member must pay when a physician prescribes the drug.63
TPPs rely considerably on representations made by, and informa-
tion obtained from, manufacturers throughout the process of approv-
ing a drug for inclusion in its formulary.64  Doctors then rely on the
TPP’s formulary, which is directly and indirectly influenced by the
drug manufacturers.  This raises questions as to whether subsequent
doctor prescription decisions are sufficiently independent to sever the
causal relationship between drug manufacturers and TPPs.65
C. First and Third Circuits: Physicians’ Prescription Decisions Keep
the Causal Chain Intact
This Section explores the First and Third Circuits’ approach to
RICO causation.  It explores the First Circuit’s decision in In re
Neurontin66 and then analyzes the Third Circuit’s approach in In re
Avandia.67
56. Id. at 29.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 28.
60. In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 28.
61. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 635; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 28–29.
62. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 635.
63.  Id.
64. E.g., In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 29.
65. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 643–46; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 29; UFCW Local 1776, 620
F.3d at 134–36; United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa., 400 F. App’x at 257.
66. In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 21.
67. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 633.
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1. First Circuit Approach to RICO Causation
The First Circuit holds that prescription decisions of prescribing
doctors pose no bar to RICO causation.68  In In re Neurontin, health-
care giant Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (Kaiser) alleged drug
manufacturer Pfizer, Inc. (Pfizer) violated RICO § 1962 by fraudu-
lently marketing Neurontin, an anti-epileptic drug, for off-label uses.69
In 1993, the FDA approved the drug for the treatment of epileptic
seizures and set the maximum daily dose at 1800 milligrams.70  In
1995, Pfizer developed strategies to market the drug for off-label uses
such as migraines and bipolar disorder.71  Over the next few years,
Pfizer began marketing to TPPs for such uses in doses exceeding the
FDA-approved 1800 milligrams per day.72  These marketing efforts
proved effective as Neurontin sales reached $2 billion in 2003 and
over one-third of the prescriptions treated off-label indications.73
However, throughout this process Pfizer failed to disclose potential
depression-related side effects.74  In 2008, the FDA issued a warning
to physicians regarding the possibility of depression, suicidal tenden-
cies, and unusual changes in patient behavior.75
Kaiser relied on the manufacturer’s misrepresentations in the prep-
aration of its monographs, directly affecting Kaiser’s decision to place
Neurontin on its formulary without restrictions.76  Evidence showed
that Kaiser’s “physicians received and acted upon Pfizer’s misrepre-
sentations . . . through information sent [to them] . . . and information
provided to [the physicians] at Pfizer-sponsored events.”77  If Pfizer
had not misrepresented Neurontin’s safety issues, PBM’s monograph
would have contained more accurate information regarding the drug’s
risks.  As a result, the drug likely would not have been given preferen-
tial status on Kaiser’s formulary.78  Consequently, Kaiser suffered an
injury by reimbursing its members for Neurontin, rather than cheaper
alternatives available on the market.79  Kaiser estimated Pfizer’s fraud
68. In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 38–39.
69. Id. at 27–28.  Off-label conditions are those not included in the official FDA-approved
drug label. Id.
70. Id. at 27.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 28.
73. In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 27.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 29.  Such restrictions, for instance, would have included warnings for the depressive
behavior Pfizer failed to disclose. Id. at 27.
77. Id. at 40–41.
78. In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 40–41.
79. Id.
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resulted in over $60 million in damages from prescription
reimbursement.80
In finding Pfizer’s misrepresentations satisfied RICO’s proximate
cause requirement, the First Circuit relied on common law “direct-
ness,” as well as three functional factors formulated by the Supreme
Court.81  Regarding the common law standard, the Supreme Court
noted in Holmes that a proximate cause analysis generally requires a
direct relationship between the injury suffered and the alleged injuri-
ous conduct.82  The Court also elucidated the following factors for
courts to consider when making the proximate cause inquiry: (1) proof
of injury, (2) administrative efficiency, and (3) public policy.83  Fur-
thermore, the Court in Holmes noted the difficulty and complexity of
calculating damages when an injury is less direct.84  The Court noted
that “recognizing claims of the indirectly injured would force courts to
adopt complicated rules apportioning damages among plaintiffs re-
moved at different levels of injury from the violative acts”.85  How-
ever, in Bridge the Court unanimously held that first-party reliance on
the misrepresentation is not required under RICO.86
Based on these considerations, the First Circuit held “the causal
chain is anything but attenuated” between the drug manufacturer and
TPPs.87  The court emphasized Pfizer understood the structure of the
U.S. healthcare system and the fact that TPPs, not physicians, pay for
the drugs.88  Further, Pfizer’s fraudulent marketing scheme was de-
pendent upon Kaiser paying for the drug.89  Accordingly, their eco-
nomic injury was foreseeable.90  The Court held the causal link is not
automatically broken even if a manufacturer directs its alleged mis-
representations towards prescribing doctors.91  Therefore, in the First
Circuit direct reliance on the misrepresentations by TPPs is not
required.92
80. Id. at 32.
81. Id. at 36 (citing Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268).
82. Id. (citing Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268).
83. Id. (citing Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269–70).
84. In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 36 (citing Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269).
85. Id. (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269).
86. Id. at 36–37 (citing Bridge, 553 U.S. at 641).
87. Id. at 38.
88. Id. at 38–39.
89. Id.
90. In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 38–39.
91. Id. at 37.
92. Id.
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2. Third Circuit Approach to RICO Causation
The Third Circuit echoes the First Circuit approach, asserting the
presence of intermediaries, such as doctors and patients, does not de-
stroy causation in RICO claims.93  In In re Avandia, TPPs argued
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) misrepresented safety risks associated with
Avandia, a Type II diabetes drug.94  Once the FDA approved Avandia
in 1999, GSK marketed the drug as cheaper and more effective than
existing Type II diabetes drugs.95  Consequently, TPPs included
Avandia in its formularies and covered the cost of prescriptions at a
favorable rate.96  However, health concerns related to the drug began
surfacing in 2001.97  Following the FDA’s request, GSK added a pre-
scription label warning that the drug may cause increased risk of fluid
retention.98  Five years later, Avandia’s label required an additional
warning that the drug may cause increased risk of heart-related issues,
including heart attack.99  The situation further deteriorated in 2007
when the FDA recommended the addition of “black box” warnings100
to Avandia’s label to warn of the risk of heart failure.101  Then in 2010,
a U.S. Senate Finance Committee report concluded GSK was aware
of these cardiac risks for years yet “failed to notify the FDA and the
public of these risks despite its duty to do so.”102
In reaching its decision, the Third Circuit relied on the Supreme
Court’s holding in Bridge.103  In Bridge, Phoenix Bond & Indemnity.
Co. (Phoenix) bid for county tax liens in Illinois and brought a RICO
claim alleging its competitors committed mail fraud by making mis-
representations during the bidding process.104  Phoenix claimed its
competitors engaged in fraud by mailing notices containing misrepre-
sentations to property owners.105  However, the competitors argued
Phoenix did not rely on those alleged representations—the property
93. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 645.
94. Id. at 634.
95. Id. at 635.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 635.
100. A black box warning is listed on the label of a prescription drug to warn of serious and
life-threatening risks of the drug.  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., A Guide to Drug Safety Terms at
FDA, http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/UCM107976.pdf. (last
visited Nov. 13, 2016).
101. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 635.
102. Id. at 635–36.
103. Bridge, 553 U.S. at 639.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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owners did.106  Consequently, the Supreme Court held no general
principle states misrepresentation can only cause injury to a party that
relies on it, but rather, a “plaintiff’s loss must be a foreseeable result
of someone’s reliance on the misrepresentation.”107
In applying Bridge’s holding, the court in Avandia considered the
TPPs to be the “primary and intended victims of the scheme to de-
fraud.”  Accordingly, the economic harm suffered was a “foreseeable
and natural consequence of [the] scheme.”108  Because the TPPs paid
for these drugs they were the intended victims.  In fact, GSK’s fraudu-
lent scheme could only be successful if the TPPs paid GSK for the
drug.109
D. Second and Ninth Circuit Courts: Physicians’ Prescription
Decisions Sever the Causal Chain
This Section explores the Second and Ninth Circuits’ approach to
RICO causation, which hold prescription decisions of physicians sever
causation between manufacturers and TPPs.110  First, this Section dis-
cusses the Second Circuit’s decision in UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly
& Co.,111 and then explores the Ninth Circuit’s approach in United
Food & Commercial Workers Central Pennsylvania v. Amgen, Inc.112
1. Second Circuit Approach to RICO Causation
Unlike the First and Third Circuits, the Second Circuit held in
UFCW Local 1776 that physician prescription decisions sever the
chain of causation.113  In 1996, the FDA approved Eli Lilly’s drug
Zyprexa for treating schizophrenia.114  In 2000, the company began
marketing the drug directly to physicians for off-label uses.115  While
physicians are permitted to prescribe drugs for off-label uses, “manu-
facturers are prohibited from promoting off-label uses in marketing a
drug.”116  TPPs argued that Eli Lilly turned its marketing efforts to-
106. Id.
107. Id. at 655.
108. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 645 (quoting Bridge, 553 U.S. at 658).
109. Id. at 645.
110. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 134; United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa., 400
F. App’x at 257.
111. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 135.
112. United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa., 400 F. App’x at 257.
113. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 135.
114. Id. at 124.
115. Id. at 127.
116. Id. Manufacturers are prohibited from advertising or promoting drugs for off-label uses
in an effort to protect patients from using the drugs to treat conditions for which there is little to
no clinical evidence to support such use. Off-label Use: The Fine Line Between Illegal Promotion
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wards physicians to promote off-label uses of Zyprexa.117  For exam-
ple, Eli Lilly targeted the nursing home industry and instructed 280
sales representatives to suggest to physicians that Zyprexa was benefi-
cial for diseases such as dementia.118  Such assertions were made de-
spite a lack of evidence that the drug was effective for treating
dementia—in fact clinical evidence showed it was detrimental to the
cognitive function of Alzheimer’s patients.119  This marketing ap-
proach yielded some success; by 2002 approximately two-thirds of
Zyprexa’s prescriptions were for off-label purposes.120
In 2003, however, the FDA required labelling changes to Zyprexa
to warn of pancreatitis, hyperglycemia, and diabetes.121  In 2005, a
black box warning was added to warn of increased risk of death for
elderly dementia patients.122  Following the label changes, consump-
tion of the drug experienced a 50% decrease between 2003 and
2008.123
Unsurprisingly, TPPs brought a RICO claim alleging that Eli Lilly
became aware of some harmful side effects during the drug’s develop-
ment and failed to disclose this to the FDA, even after the drug made
it to the market.124  In particular, TPPs asserted the drug was associ-
ated with significant weight gain and that Eli Lilly falsely marketed
the drug as superior despite knowing of this serious side effect.125
In holding that prescription decisions sever proximate cause in
RICO cases, the court described the causal chain as follows: “[the
manufacturer] distributes misinformation about Zyprexa, physicians
rely upon the misinformation and prescribe Zyprexa, TPPs relying on
the advice of PBMs and their Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committees
place Zyprexa on their formularies as approved drugs.”126  Perhaps
fatally, the TPPs did not allege they relied on the manufacturer’s mis-
representations, but rather that the physicians did.127  As such, the
court found that unless it can be proved that all prescription decisions
and Useful Information, BIOWORLD, http://www.bioworld.com/content/label-use-fine-line-be
tween-illegal-promotion-and-useful-information (last visited Nov. 13, 2016).
117. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 127.
118. Id. at 128.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 125.
122. Id.
123. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 125.
124. Id. at 124.
125. Id. at 124–25.  Confidential internal documents revealed Ely Lilly was aware of these side
effects, but did not understand the source of them.
126. Id. at 134.
127. Id.
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by every doctor were made in reliance on the drug manufacturer’s
fraudulent misrepresentations, the chain of causation is severed.128
The court held that it was the TPPs failure to negotiate the price of
Zyprexa with the manufacturer that resulted in overpaying for the
drug.129  Consequently, the conduct giving rise to the harm—the fail-
ure to negotiate—was considered distinct from the conduct giving rise
to the fraud—the alleged misrepresentations.130  There was evidence
that TPPs requested rebates from the manufacturer or internally re-
stricted the use of Zyprexa for some indications.131  But even after the
drug’s side effects were made public most TPPs continued paying full
price for its prescription.132  Further, the court held the TPPs’ “theory
of liability rests on the independent action of third and even fourth
parties,” given that physicians, PBMs, and others are all links on the
chain between the manufacturer and TPPs thereby making the chain
too attenuated.133
2. Ninth Circuit Approach to RICO Causation
In In re Epogen,  two TPPs attempted to bring a RICO claim
against Amgen, one of the United States’ largest pharmaceutical com-
panies.134  The TPPs’ complaint did not survive a motion to dismiss
because it alleged a weak causal chain between the drug manufacturer
and the TPPs.135  The court held the causal link pled was insufficient
to satisfy the proximate cause requirements for RICO claims set forth
by the Supreme Court in Bridge.136
The TPPs alleged Amgen unlawfully promoted two drugs, Epogen
and Aranesp (jointly, EPO), that stimulated the production of red
blood cells.137  In 1989, the FDA approved Epogen for treating ane-
mia in chronic renal failure patients, HIV patients, and cancer patients
undergoing chemotherapy.138  In 2001, Aranesp was approved for sim-
ilar uses.139  In 2007, an article was published by The Cancer Letter
regarding increased mortality rates in cancer patients that utilized
128. Id. at 134–36.
129. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 134.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. In re Epogen, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 1284.
135. United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa,. 400 F. App’x at 257.
136. Id.
137. In re Epogen, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 1284–85.
138. Id. at 1285.
139. Id.
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Aranesp.140  As a result, the FDA issued a black box warning for off-
label uses of EPO.141  This warning also included results of a study
indicating some cancer patients taking EPO died in half the time of
patients that were given placebos.142  The TPPs argued Amgen en-
gaged in racketeering activity, including mail and wire fraud, by un-
lawfully promoting EPO for unsafe, off-label uses.143
The Ninth Circuit held the complaint failed to “identify statements
or representations made by Amgen that were false or misleading at
the time they were made, as required in a civil RICO action based on
mail and wire fraud.”144  While the TPPs alleged the manufacturer
concealed adverse test results, they failed to identify particular study
results that Amgen allegedly promoted.145  Finally, the causal chain
between the manufacturer and TPPs was considered too attenuated
because there were at least four separate links: “(1) the manufac-
turer’s listing of Aranesp to treat anemia of cancer, (2) Medicare’s
consequent decision to cover Aranesp for anemia of cancer, (3) TPPs’
decision to cover Aranesp for anemia of cancer (along with heart fail-
ure patients and others), and (4) doctors’ prescription decisions to
prescribe Aranesp and Epogen.”146  The court suggested a drug manu-
facturer is too remote from a TPP-plaintiff when third parties exist in
the chain leading to a particular drug being prescribed.147  In this case,
the involvement of the manufacturer, Medicare, and physicians gave
rise to a remoteness the TPPs were unable to overcome in order to
establish proximate cause for the economic loss they suffered.148  The
court emphasized the need for a strong causal link between the manu-
facturer and the alleged injured party which, fatally, the TPPs were
unable to establish.149
III. ANALYSIS
This Circuit split highlights a potentially disastrous outcome: that
fraudulent conduct causing direct harm could go unpunished and un-
140. Paul Goldberg, FDA’s ODAC To Review EPO Agents In May; SEC Probes Amgen De-
lay In Study Disclosure, THE CANCER LETTER, Mar. 2, 2007, at 1, 8.
141. In re Epogen, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 1285–86.
142. Id. at 1286.
143. Id. at 1287.
144. United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa., 400 F. App’x at 257.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 257 (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)).
148. Id.
149. Id.
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compensated.150  This Part argues that adoption of the approach by
the First and Third Circuits is preferable because it (1) increases ac-
countability of drug manufacturers towards TPPs when marketing
new drugs, (2) more closely reflects the Supreme Court’s characteriza-
tion of proximate cause, and (3) accurately captures the foreseeability
requirement of proximate cause utilized in other areas of tort law.151
A. Increasing Drug Manufacturer Accountability
Drug manufacturer marketing often targets TPPs as they ultimately
pay for some, if not all, of a prescription’s cost.152  Accordingly, mis-
leading marketing results in significant economic loss for TPPs and
they have limited or no effective recourse.  Even when marketing is
directed towards physicians, its impact is problematic as it interferes
with the physician’s ability to make independent decisions concerning
the patient.153  While this Comment has explored a relatively small
sampling of RICO case law, the reality is that fraudulent and mislead-
ing conduct by drug manufacturers in the United States is rampant.154
First, this Section explores the prevalence of such conduct.  Next, this
section explores why adopting the First and Third Circuits’ approach
would more effectively combat the issue.155
150. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 134; United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa., 400
F. App’x at 255 (both cases illustrating situations where conduct that was clearly fraudulent and
misleading on the part of drug manufacturers was nevertheless held to fall short of the standard
required to receive RICO reprimand).
151. Bridge, 553 U.S. at 639; Overseas Tankship (U.K.), Ltd., v. Morts Dock & Eng’g Co. (The
Wagon Mound No. 1), [1961] AC 388, 1961 WL 20739.
152. This data is based on 2014 expenditures.  Sifferlin, supra note 1.
153. Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent
Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 12, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525) (quoting Sheryl
Calabro, Note, Breaking the Shield of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine: Placing the Blame
Where It Belongs, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 2241, 2259 (2003–2004)). See also Lori-Ann Rickard &
Amy Fehn, Recent Developments in Regulation of Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices, HEALTH
LAW., Dec. 2006, at 16, 16 (finding that “physicians’ prescribing practices are . . . affected by
interactions with drug companies”); Jason Dana & George Lowenstein, A Social Science Per-
spective on Gifts to Physicians from Industry, 290 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 252, 252 (2003).
154. Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent
Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 3, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525).
155. See, e.g., In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 634; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 26; UFCW Local
1776, 620 F.3d at 132; United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa., 400 F. App’x at 257; Brief
for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent Ass’n Health &
Welfare Fund at 7, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525).
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1. Prevalence of Fraudulent and Misleading Pharmaceutical
Advertising
Despite FDA regulations squarely prohibiting false or misleading
statements concerning drug safety and effectiveness,156 manufacturers
still frequently engage in this conduct.157  From 2001 to 2005, the FDA
sent at least 170 notices to over eighty companies for false and mis-
leading drug advertising.158  These notices highlighted the companies’
concealment of negative clinical trial results and misreporting.159  Fur-
ther, between 2003 and 2007, the FDA sent notices to pharmaceutical
companies concerning unlawful promotion of off-label drug uses that
exposed patients to considerable risk of harm.160  All the while, TPPs
continued to reimburse prescription medications for their insured de-
spite this fraudulent behavior.161  The FDA has noted, “it is very diffi-
cult, if not impossible, for [the] FDA’s supplementary monitoring and
surveillance efforts to identify all off-label promotion that may
occur.”162
Pharmaceutical companies often utilize industry-funded clinical
studies in advertisements.163  These studies routinely generate biased
results instead of objective evidence, which taints decisions made con-
cerning drug efficacy and safety.164  For instance Neurontin, was pro-
moted165 via commissioned research.166  The pharmaceutical company
156. 21 C.F.R. § 99.101(a)(4) (1998); Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioners, Sergeants Benevolent Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 7, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem)
(No. 15-1525).
157. Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent
Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 7, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525).
158. Id. See also ABIGAIL CAPLOVITZ, TURNING MEDICINE INTO SNAKE OIL: HOW PHARMA-
CEUTICAL MARKETERS PUT PATIENTS AT RISK 7 (2006).
159. Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent
Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 7, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525). See also
CAPLOVITZ, supra note 158, at 1.
160. Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent
Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 7, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525). See also Prescrip-
tion Drugs: FDA’s Oversight of the Promotion of Drugs for Off-Label Uses at 5–6, U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. (July 2008).
161. In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 40–41.
162. Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent
Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 7, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525). See also Prescrip-
tion Drugs: FDA’s Oversight, supra note 160.
163. Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent
Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 8, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525).
164. Id.
165. The drug was promoted at the time by Parke-Davis, a division of Warner-Lambert whose
parent company is Pfizer.  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Warner-Lambert to Pay $430 Million
to Resolve Criminal & Civil Health Care Liability Relating to Off-Label Promotion (May 13,
2004), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2004/May/04_civ_322.htm.
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formulated a “publication strategy”167 whereby academics were solic-
ited with various grants and speaking opportunities168 to publish and
promote Neurontin.169  Additional marketing tactics involved publish-
ing Neurontin research while disguising its promotional purpose and
conducting teleconferences with prescribing physicians that were
moderated by well-remunerated contracted physicians involved in the
marketing scheme.170  This initiative proved wildly successful, and re-
sulted in “tremendous sales . . . for uses for which it was not effec-
tive.”171  Sales for the drug rose in the U.S. from $98 million to $3
billion.172  The manufacturer was eventually found to have engaged in
“illegal and fraudulent promotion”173 of Neurontin, which “corrupted
the information process relied upon by doctors . . . thereby putting
patients at risk [and] depriving health plans of the informed, impartial
judgment of medical professionals . . . on which the program relies to
allocate scarce financial resources to provide necessary and appropri-
ate care.”174
Another well-known example of this is a study of the drug Vioxx
funded by Merck & Company (Merck).175  Prior to the FDA approv-
ing the drug in 1999, Merck conducted the study176 in an effort to
prove Vioxx was a superior painkiller that resulted in fewer gastroin-
testinal issues compared to its competitors.177  The apparent purpose
of the study was to test the drug’s safety, but it was later discovered
166. Seth Landefeld & Michael A. Steinman, The Neurontin Legacy—Marketing through
Misinformation and Manipulation, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 103, 103–06 (2009).
167. Id.; Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent
Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 9, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525).
168. Landefeld & Steinman, supra note 166, at 104.
169. Id.; Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent
Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 9, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525).
170. Landefeld & Steinman, supra note 166, at 104 (some of these physicians were paid
upwards of $170,000 over four years to moderate these phone calls and market the “benefits” of
Neurontin to prescribing physicians).
171. Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent
Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 9, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525); Landefeld, supra
note 166, at 104.
172. Landefeld & Steinman, supra note 166, at 104.
173. Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent
Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 9, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525).
174. DOJ Press Release, supra note 165.
175. Kevin P. Hill et al., The ADVANTAGE Seeding Trial: A Review of Internal Documents,
149 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 251, 251–58 (2008); Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 8, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016)
(mem) (No. 15-1525).
176. Claire Bombardier et. al., Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofecoxib
and Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1520, 1528 (2000).
177. Snigdha Prakash & Vikki Valentine, Timeline: The Rise and Fall of Vioxx, NPR (Nov. 10,
2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5470430.
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Merck’s marketing department designed the study to boost sales.178
The study eventually indicated Vioxx caused heart attacks, strokes,
and even death.179  Both the study’s result and purpose were not dis-
closed to the participants or the New England Journal of Medicine
(NEJM) which published the study.180  Five years after the drug was
released, Merck discontinued sale of Vioxx.181  Unfortunately, Vioxx
had already generated billions of dollars in sales worldwide, in part
due to the clinical study.182  The NEJM’s Editor-in-Chief later re-
vealed the journal was “hoodwinked” by the manufacturer and the
authors of the study should have disclosed the side effects prior to
initial publication.183
These illustrations demonstrate misconduct is ongoing and costing
TPPs millions of dollars as they are paying for prescription drugs they
would not have included in their formularies absent pharmaceutical
fraud.184  The First and Third Circuits offer a solution for TPPs target-
ing the deep pockets of pharmaceutical companies.  This approach
could further deter unlawful drug promotion and advertising
practices.
2. The Approach that Leaves Intact the Causal Chain
The First and Third Circuits’ approach adheres to the Supreme
Court’s RICO jurisprudence,185 while sufficiently deterring drug man-
ufacturers from  fraudulently exaggerating drug safety and efficacy.186
The Supreme Court has held that RICO contains both but-for and
proximate causation requirements.187  While not articulating an ex-
178. Hill, supra note 175, at 251–58; Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioners, Sergeants Benevolent Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 8, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem)
(No. 15-1525).
179. Prakash, supra note 177.
180. Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent
Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 8, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525).
181. Prakash, supra note 177.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Brief for AARP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Sergeants Benevolent
Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 7, 137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525). See e.g., In re
Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 41 (Kaiser estimated it suffered $60 million in losses as a result of Pfizer’s
misrepresentations); Prescription Drugs: FDA’s Oversight, supra note 160.
185. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 131.  A substantive RICO violation involves engaging in
any of the “racketeering” activities listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), such as mail and wire fraud.
This is a common ground for RICO claims against drug manufacturers as they circulate their
misrepresentations to TPPs using these methods. See, e.g., Sergeants, 806 F.3d at 74; In re
Avandia, 804 F.3d at 636; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 34; In re Epogen, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 1287.
186. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Sergeants Benevolent Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund at 15,
137 S. Ct. 140 (2016) (mem) (No. 15-1525).
187. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268 (1992); In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 34.
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plicit rule, the Court has held proximate cause requires “some direct
relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct al-
leged.”188  Providing further explanation, the Court has noted the link
should not be too remote189 and first-party reliance on the misrepre-
sentation is not necessarily required.190  Additionally, the Court ar-
ticulated three factors that emphasize the need for directness between
the injury and alleged misconduct: (1) proof of injury, (2) administra-
tive efficiency, and (3) public policy.191  Finally, the injury192 must
have been caused by the substantive RICO violation.193
The First Circuit adopted an approach to proximate cause that is
consistent with the Supreme Court in Holmes.194  In In re Neurontin,
the First Circuit analyzed the three factors discussed by the Court,
highlighting the complexity that could arise if courts began recogniz-
ing claims from plaintiffs indirectly injured.195  Additionally, the First
Circuit  noted the public policy interest in deterring illegal conduct
and questioned whether a finding of proximate cause would serve that
interest.196
Based on its own considerations, informed by the Supreme Court’s
approach in Holmes, the First Circuit held that “the causal chain is
anything but attenuated” between the drug manufacturer and
TPPs.197  In explaining why the injury was sufficiently direct, the court
emphasized that Pfizer understood the structure of the U.S. health-
care system and that the drugs would be paid for by TPPs rather than
physicians.198  Pfizer targeted TPPs because it knew the drug would
only be prescribed and paid for if it landed near the top of the TPPs’
formularies.199  In order to ensure this high ranking, Pfizer funneled
the fraudulent information directly to the TPPs, which then included it
in their monographs.200  Thus, the fraudulent marketing scheme would
only be successful if the TPP was provided with the false misrepresen-
188. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268 (1992); In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 34.
189. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268, 271.
190. Bridge, 553 U.S. at 639.
191. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269–70; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 36.
192. The Supreme Court has clarified that such injury is economic in nature and constitutes
injury to one’s business or property. Bridge, 553 U.S. at 649.
193. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 131.  This element effectively constitutes the causation
requirement. Id.
194. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 36.
195. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 36.
196. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 36.
197. In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 38.
198. Id. at 38–39.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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tations.201  Because Kaiser and other TPPs were the intended victims
of the racketeering activity, the economic injury they suffered was
foreseeable.202  The court took this approach a step further and held
that even if a manufacturer directs its misrepresentations towards pre-
scribing doctors, the causal link is not automatically broken because
direct reliance on the misrepresentations by TPPs is not required.203
The Third Circuit has also followed the Supreme Court’s guidance
on proximate cause that a “plaintiff’s loss must be a foreseeable result
of someone’s reliance on the misrepresentation.”204  In Avandia, the
manufacturer misrepresented to TPPs the safety risks associated with
a diabetes drug and marketed the drug as cheaper and more effective
than existing alternatives.205  As a result, the TPPs included Avandia
in its formularies and covered a higher percentage of  the prescrip-
tion’s cost; specifically, TPPs paid approximately $140 per month for
Avandia prescriptions, as opposed to $40 to $50 for the alternatives.206
In applying the Supreme Court’s approach, the Third Circuit  found
the TPPs were the drug manufacturer’s “primary and intended vic-
tims,” and the economic harm they suffered was a “foreseeable and
natural consequence of [the] scheme.”207  Accordingly, the actions of
the manufacturer were deemed a sufficiently direct cause of the TPPs
injury to satisfy the proximate cause requirements of a RICO claim.208
B. The Approach that Severs the Causal Chain
This Section explores the Second and Ninth Circuit’s approach to
RICO causation, which holds prescription decisions of physicians
sever causation between manufacturers and TPPs.209  This Section ad-
dresses the Second Circuit decision in UFCW Local 1776 and the
Ninth Circuit decision in United Food.210  The Second and Ninth Cir-
cuits assert that, even if the TPPs suffer harm as a result of manufac-
turer fraud, when similar misrepresentations are made to prescribing
physicians, TPPs effectively lose their standing to bring a RICO claim
as the directness of the TPPs reliance on the misrepresentations is
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 37.
204. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 645 (quoting Bridge, 553 U.S. at 655).
205. Id. at 635.
206. Id. at 636.
207. Id. at 645 (quoting Bridge, 553 U.S. at 658).
208. Id.
209. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 121; United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa., 400
Fed. App’x at 257.
210. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d 121 at 134; United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa.,
400 Fed. App’x at 257.
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clouded.211  The approach of these circuits raises concerns for TPPs
and consumers alike by limiting TPPs’ ability to recover for economic
loss suffered as a result of drug manufacturer fraud, and exposing con-
sumers to serious health complications.212
The facts in UFCW are similar to those in In re Neurontin and In re
Avandia.213  Drug manufacturers distributed misinformation concern-
ing the drug Zyprexa to TPPs that utilized the information to place
the drug on their formularies.214  Consequently, patients that were
prescribed the drug suffered significant weight gain and other side ef-
fects that were concealed by the manufacturer.215  The Second Circuit
held that the TPPs made a critical procedural error by alleging physi-
cians, rather than TPPs, relied on the manufacturers’ misrepresenta-
tions thereby precluding TPPs from recovering under RICO.216
Nevertheless, TPPs were victims of fraud and suffered economic loss
because Zyprexa was included in its formularies at a higher price than
it would have been if the TPPs were aware of the drug’s possible side
effects.217  In effect, TPPs overpaid for Zyprexa at a rate $77 higher
than competitor products due to its purported greater efficacy.218 The
Second Circuit created an artificial distinction between the directness
of fraud suffered by physicians and TPPs.219  While marketing
Zyprexa, manufacturers engaged in direct misrepresentation to TPPs
affecting the drug’s pricing by obscuring its side effects.220  There was
evidence that most TPPs continued paying full price for Zyprexa pre-
scriptions even after the drug’s side effects were made public, but this
does not negate the economic loss suffered by TPPs as a result of the
manufacturer’s initial fraud.221  Given the court stated the failure of
TPPs to negotiate Zyprexa’s price demonstrated a lack of proximate
cause, it seems rather unlikely the Second Circuit’s decision would
have materially changed if TPPs were clearer in alleging their reliance
on manufacturers’ misrepresentations.222  This represents a departure
from the First and Third Circuits’ approach because despite levelling a
211. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 134.
212. United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa., 400 Fed. App’x at 257.
213. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 635; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 27–29.
214. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 124–25.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 127.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 134.
220. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 134.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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form of fraud directly towards TPPs,223 the Second Circuit appears to
have carved out an additional responsibility for TPPs (that is, to nego-
tiate pricing) in order to bring a successful RICO claim.224
The Ninth Circuit in United Food also severed the causal chain be-
tween drug manufacturers and TPPs because there were other parties
in the chain that caused physicians to make prescription decisions.225
While the manufacturer promoted EPO for unsafe uses,226 the court
nevertheless precluded TPP recovery under RICO due to the exis-
tence of third parties, such as Medicare and physicians, that led to the
prescription of EPO.227  In the view of the Ninth Circuit, the presence
of these third parties somehow created a remoteness that severed the
causal chain between manufacturers and TPPs.228  The improper pro-
motion of EPO relied on by TPPs, however, appears to be the type of
“direct relation” the Supreme Court has found establishes proximate
cause.229
C. Analogizing Foreseeability in the TPP Context to Personal
Injury Claims
To further support implementation of the First and Third Circuit
approach, it is helpful to consider the analogous operation of proxi-
mate cause in other areas of tort law.230
In personal injury cases, a defendant’s unreasonable conduct will be
the proximate cause of an injury if the injury is reasonably foreseeable
given the risk of the conduct, regardless of the extent or manner of the
harm.231  If the injury is too remote from the defendant’s unreasona-
ble conduct, it will be unforeseeable and outside the scope of defen-
dant’s liability.232   As noted above, the actions taken by drug
manufacturers were calculated and intentional.233  Drug manufactur-
ers appear to be targeting TPPs because they are the largest financers
of prescription medication and TPPs make decisions to include drugs
on their formularies based on the fraudulent misrepresentations of
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa., 400 F. App’x at 257.
226. In re Epogen, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 1287.
227. United Food & Commercial Workers Cent. Pa., 400 F. App’x at 257.
228. Id.
229. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268.
230. See, e.g., The Wagon Mound No. 1 [1961] AC 388, 1961 WL 20739.
231. Id.; Hughes v. Lord Advocate [1963] A.C. 837 (H.L.).
232. The Wagon Mound No. 1 [1961] AC 388, 1961 WL 20739.
233. See, e.g., In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 635; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 27–28; UFCW Local
1776, 620 F.3d at 124; In re Epogen, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 1284–85.
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manufacturers.234  Therefore, the economic injury they suffer in pay-
ing for prescriptions is clearly foreseeable.235
In personal injury cases, a defendant may argue a certain event or
action was an intervening cause that severed liability.236  An interven-
ing cause severs a defendant’s liability to the plaintiff when it is a su-
perseding cause.237  One such intervening cause is a “third party
intentional act.”238  Manufacturers may therefore argue the prescrib-
ing decisions of physicians constitute third party intentional acts that
sever the causal chain destroying a TPP’s RICO claim.239  However,
because drug manufacturers directly provide misinformation to TPPs,
they effectively lay the foundation for the fraudulent scheme.  Provid-
ing information to TPPs and physicians alike is so interrelated, that to
distinguish them would be a fiction and result in manufacturers un-
justly escaping billions of dollars in liability.
IV. IMPACT
This Part canvasses the impact of adopting the First and Third Cir-
cuit approach to proximate cause by allowing TPPs to bring RICO
claims regardless of physician prescription decisions.240  First, this Part
discusses how this approach protects consumers’ health and safety.
Second, this Part examines how this approach compensates TPPs for
significant economic loss resulting from drug manufacturer
misconduct.
A. Protecting Consumers’ Health and Safety
Preserving the chain of causation between drug manufacturers and
TPPs protects the health and safety of U.S. healthcare consumers.
The cases discussed in this Comment share a common thread—con-
sumers have suffered physical injuries as a result of unsafe drugs being
intentionally introduced into the market.241  These injuries were clear
in the First and Third Circuit decisions discussed above.242  In In re
234. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 635–36; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 27–29; UFCW Local 1776,
620 F.3d at 124–25, 127–28; In re Epogen, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 1290–91.
235. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 638.
236. Derdiarian v. Felix, 417 N.E.2d 1010 (N.Y. 1980).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See, e.g., UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 121; United Food & Commercial Workers Cent.
Pa., 400 F. App’x at 255.
240. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 645; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 38–39.
241. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 634; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 27; UFCW Local 1776, 620
F.3d at 124; In re Epogen, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 1286.
242. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 634; In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 27.
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Neurontin, the manufacturer failed to disclose all possible side effects
of the drug and consequently patients suffered from depression and
suicidal tendencies.243  In In re Avandia, a diabetes drug touted as
safer and more effective than competing products ultimately exposed
consumers to a greater risk of heart attack and death caused by heart-
related disease.244  Even though the Second and Ninth Circuits al-
lowed manufacturers to evade liability, these cases nonetheless in-
volved consumers who suffered physical injury at the hands of
manufacturers.245  In UFCW, there was evidence that the manufac-
turer’s schizophrenia medication caused significant weight gain, a side
effect that the manufacturer withheld from consumers and TPPs
alike.246  Finally, United Food involved a drug that treated cancer pa-
tients undergoing chemotherapy.247  The drug was eventually discov-
ered to increase mortality rates in cancer patients, with one study
revealing some patients taking the drug died in half the time of those
given a placebo.248
Ensuring TPPs can continue to bring RICO claims will deter manu-
facturers from intentionally misleading the public.249  Even if the man-
ufacturer is not intentionally misleading the public, this approach
incentivizes manufacturers to submit accurate information and accu-
rately define their products.  Under RICO, a party that brings suit can
recover treble damages.250  While consumers could bring a claim
against a manufacturer,251 their damages likely do not rise to the level
of TPPs’.  Damages suffered by TPPs are routinely hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars, and trebling such amounts obviously serves as a
greater deterrence.252
B. Compensating TPPs for Economic Loss Suffered
Establishing a proximate cause standard that makes it impossible
for TPPs to bring RICO claims when they have significant economic
loss due to the intentionally misleading, fraudulent behavior of manu-
facturers leaves TPPs with no judicial recourse for their injuries.
243. In re Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 27.
244. Id.
245. UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d at 124.
246. Id.
247. In re Epogen, 590 F. Supp. 2d at 1285.
248. Id. at 1286; Goldberg, supra note 140.
249. In re Avandia, 804 F.3d at 635.
250. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2016).
251. Id.
252. In re Neurontin, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 110 (TPP plaintiff awarded $174 million in damages);
DOJ Press Release, supra note 165.
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When a superior, innovative drug is promoted, TPPs will cover a large
portion of the drug’s cost.253  This, in turn, reduces the consumer’s co-
payment and makes the drug more affordable.254 Because TPPs are
vital to affordable prescription medication, TPPs should be entitled to
recover for substantial economic losses suffered at the hands of fraud-
ulent drug manufacturers.255
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment advocates for courts to allow TPPs to hold drug
manufacturers accountable for their fraudulent behavior.  Manufac-
turers deliberately target TPPs in their marketing efforts and inten-
tionally mislead and defraud them to increase profits.256  This should
be considered sufficiently direct to establish proximate cause.  The ec-
onomic injury suffered by TPPs and the devastating health conse-
quences to the public are clear.257  If faced with this circuit split, the
Supreme Court should hold the causal chain is intact, and allow those
directly harmed by the deceitful actions of manufacturers to receive
compensation.
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